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SEX SEGREGATION IN 
JAPANESE BUSINESS
1
The question of why Japan has only a small number of women with power 
and authority—and of how Japan might catch up with the United States and 
other Western countries in terms of social and economic status for employed 
women—is long overdue to be answered in the eyes of many feminist researchers 
and Japanese studies scholars.
Although the number of educated women in Japan has rapidly increased in the 
last few decades, there has been little change in women’s economic status; this may 
further exacerbate the problems of the country’s already declining birthrate and 
labor shortage, which may eventually lead to its economic decline. Foreign media 
have long reported on the plight of employed women in Japan and have often 
underscored the nation’s need to modernize gender norms. Japan does appear to 
be progressing with the idea that the inclusion of women is vital for Japan’s eco­
nomic growth. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated in 2014 that women’s social and 
economic advancement is necessary for the nation’s future economic growth, as 
he urged the business and public sectors to increase the ratio of women manag­
ers and leaders to 30 percent by 2020. The Japanese business federation Keidanren, 
comprising over thirteen hundred companies, responded to the government 
by proclaiming that each firm should make voluntary efforts toward improving 
women’s status to assure sustainable development of the Japanese economy.1 
Yet actual progress on overhauling sex-segregated employment and traditional 
workplace customs in Japan is slow. Why are there so few women in positions 
of authority and leadership in Japan? What prevents women from reaching 
the top?
l
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Sex segregation is the major indicator of gender inequality in employment 
and work. Vertical segregation means that women are concentrated at the lower 
end of the employment hierarchy, and horizontal segregation refers to womens 
concentration in traditionally female jobs.2 Mary Brinton has pointed out that 
Japan has higher levels of vertical sex segregation and slightly less occupational, or 
horizontal, sex segregation than the United States.3 In particular, Japan has high 
vertical sex segregation in professional and managerial jobs, which is strongly 
shaped by an age hierarchy, a major characteristic of Japanese management.4 
Maria Charles and David Grusky agree that Japan’s high level of vertical segrega­
tion is striking and that it is strongly correlated with age, yet they suggest that 
Japan may eventually catch up with the rest of the industrialized world in gender 
equality.5 These scholars’ studies also indicate that Japan’s vertical sex segregation 
could be the result of Japanese companies’ customs of lifelong employment, age- 
based promotions and pay, and related organizational and labor customs. Yet lit­
tle systematic empirical research has been done on exactly how sex segregation in 
Japanese companies continues to be shaped by this set of employment customs.
In theory, modernization, democratization, and globalization have led to a 
gender equality imperative in most advanced countries, which have adopted 
egalitarian policies that promote the participation of women in the labor force 
in order to reconcile work and family life; the goal is to modify the male- 
breadwinner model and move closer to an egalitarian dual-earner model.6 
Thus, vertical sex segregation in most advanced countries is seen as having 
lost its legitimacy. Sex segregation has declined primarily because of (1) atti- 
tudinal changes toward gender roles, (2) an increase in female labor force 
participation, and (3) a decrease in the gender gap in educational attainment.7 
Legislation against explicit discrimination and more family-friendly policies 
have also contributed to the lessening of blatant discrimination. Charles and 
Grusky report that the idea that men are more competent or better suited 
than women to traditionally male jobs, such as professional management,8 has 
increasingly withered in advanced countries.9
In general, the growth of women’s education means a corresponding rise in 
women’s value as human capital, career prospects, and earnings potential, thus 
pointing to an overall increase in women’s economic autonomy and contri­
bution to household earnings within a country.10 Women with education are 
more likely to be better employed than those with less education in high- and 
middle-income countries.11 Education (as a form of human capital) also makes 
women more attractive in the labor market and promotes their aspirations for 
economic independence. Paula England, Janet Gornick, and Emily F. Shafer 
write that “education inculcates gender-egalitarian attitudes; thus, highly edu­
cated women are expected to have higher employment levels for this ideological
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reason as well.”12 When the increased number of educated women promotes a 
corresponding increase in the skilled-labor supply and in egalitarian attitudes, it 
leads to decreased sex segregation.
Charles also points out that even though vertical sex segregation and blatant 
forms of sex discrimination have diminished in most advanced countries, and 
access to education and labor markets are more equalized in these countries, 
sex segregation in certain countries continues to be seen as legitimate.13 Indeed, 
regardless of its modern institutions and the rise of women’s education, gen­
der inequality and vertical sex segregation have changed little in Japan. Japan 
has been the second-largest economy in the world for a long time, following 
the United States, but it remains one of the most gender-unequal countries. In 
2013, Japan ranked 105th of 136 countries in the Global Gender Gap Report, in 
which the top countries are Scandinavian (Iceland, Finland, Norway, and Swe­
den). The United Kingdom ranked 18th and the United States, 23rd.14 Japan’s 
low ranking is attributable to its extremely small number of female lawmakers 
and business executives, evidence of high sex segregation in Japanese politics and 
in its economy.15 Vertical sex segregation in the workplace, where few women 
hold positions of authority and most are concentrated on the lower rungs of the 
corporate ladder, remains the major characteristic of gender inequality in Japan. 
Only 10 percent of Japan’s managers are women, far behind the United States 
and the United Kingdom, where women make up, respectively, 43 percent and 
35 percent of managers.16
In terms of education, women’s college enrollment rate in Japan soared from 
12 percent in 1980 to 32 percent in 2000, and further to 46 percent in 2012.17 
However, the rate of women middle managers (bucko) has only increased from 
1 percent in 1989 to 5 percent in 2011, while the rate of women managers at the 
lower level (kakaricho) increased from 5 percent in 1989 to only 15 percent in 
2011. Because there has been relatively little increase in the number of women 
managers in Japanese companies despite the rapid increase in women’s educa­
tion, it is likely that further growth in women’s education in Japan will not greatly 
affect the number of women managers.
The fact that there are few women in positions of authority—high vertical 
sex segregation—in Japan has often been explained as being a result of the coun­
try’s institutional and ideological embrace of traditional gender norms. Belief 
in the male-breadwinner model continues to dominate the mindset of ordinary 
Japanese people, and family formation and government tax and pension policies 
have reinforced it. The typical Japanese family’s welfare has long relied on its 
close connection with Japanese companies. A company’s lifelong-employment 
system and its guarantee of economic security for a man, with the assumption 
that women will care for the family, have saved the government considerable
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welfare expenditure and propelled economic development in postwar Japan.18 
Past research on Japan has indicated that the ideology of gendered separate 
spheres has long provided justification for the corporate relegation of women 
to assistant positions in the workplace with limited opportunities; women have 
been expected to quit their jobs when they marry and thus were given mostly 
easy tasks and biased evaluations.19 Others have pointed out that the workplace 
customs of lifelong employment and seniority pay and promotion in Japanese 
companies work against women, since the point of lifelong employment is that 
those who work longest are rewarded the most.20 Business scholars have also 
pointed out Japanese management’s exclusion of women and normalization of 
women’s low status.21 However, systematic studies have not yet been done on how 
each custom under the lifelong-employment system—including seniority pay 
and promotion, gender-based hiring, long working hours, and gender biases— 
hampers women’s work prospects and, most important, leads to the high level of 
vertical sex segregation in Japan.
Women’s marginal employment status has been the default in postwar Japan 
and has been at the nexus of Japan’s institutional relations among the state, busi­
ness and labor market, and family; thus, changing those things that have inhib­
ited women’s status will require changes in all of these other realms. When I argue 
that the low status of women has operated economically and ideologically 
as part of the Japanese protection-based employment system, I mean not only that 
part-time employed women and temporary women workers have enabled com­
panies to save on labor costs,22 but also that the logic of corporate cost saving has 
been inherent in the customs of hiring, pay, and promotion and has reinforced 
workplace stereotypes, which, therefore, continue to block women’s chances to 
draw even with men. Reducing vertical sex segregation in Japanese companies 
will be difficult without changing this traditional logic by revitalizing the labor 
market, making rigorous use of performance-based pay and promotion over 
simple age-based seniority, and instituting affirmative action-type policies and 
gender-equality training. Without these changes, women in Japanese companies 
will likely continue to be relegated to low-paying jobs or simply expected to fol­
low the patriarchal work pattern and face discrimination.
Gender inequality in Japan reminds us of Herbert J. Gans’s popular soci­
ological argument that poverty in America serves a latent function.23 Gans 
argued that poverty does not wane because it serves the purposes of the afflu­
ent. He even provides a list of thirteen benefits to poverty in America. For 
example, the existence of poverty generates a labor pool that is willing to per­
form the dirty work that members of the affluent groups refuse to do. The 
poor also need assistance from psychiatrists, social workers, and police officers; 
thus, their presence generates a large number of jobs for these professionals.
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They even consume expired food when it becomes available at cheaper prices. 
In an ideological sense, the poor also allow those in the middle class and the 
fortunate to feel better about themselves by reminding them of their Protes­
tant work ethic and belief in individual achievement. Thus, they will remain 
where they are, at the bottom of society. According to Gans, poverty persists 
not just because it fulfills a number of functions but also because many of the 
alternatives to poverty would create dysfunction for the affluent and powerful 
members of society:
Many of the functions served by the poor could be replaced if pov­
erty were eliminated, but almost always at higher costs to others, par­
ticularly more affluent others. Consequently, a functional analysis must 
conclude that poverty persists not only because it fulfills a number of 
positive functions but also because many of the functional alternatives 
to poverty would be quite dysfunctional for the affluent members of 
society. . .  social phenomena like poverty can be eliminated only when 
they become dysfunctional for the affluent or powerful, or when the 
powerless can obtain enough power to change society.24
Similarly, having women available as cheap labor at the bottom of the work­
place heap has been functional not only for Japanese business, which can then 
save on labor costs, but also to the Japanese state, because having a caretaker at 
home has saved on welfare costs, secured men's employment, and contributed 
to Japan’s economic development. There is little incentive to change women’s 
status, similar to that of the poor in the United States, as long as the alternatives 
are expensive and dysfunctional to business management. The logic of the func­
tion of vertical sex segregation itself is nothing new. But just as the poor in the 
United States have been blamed for their status and their lack of power has been 
legitimized, women’s low status has been tactfully legitimized in Japan. In this 
book I examine not so much how women’s concentration at the bottom has been 
functional to the Japanese system but how Japanese companies’ hiring, salary, 
and promotion practices and culture of misogyny have locked so many women 
out and allowed only a very small number of women, in the guise of honorary 
men, to go up the ladder.
Japan’s corporate governance and management systems have also been driven 
and legitimized by the nation’s determination to not only survive but thrive eco­
nomically and its unstated goal of catching up with the West. Japan has long 
normalized the values of individual sacrifice, economic development and mate­
rial wealth, and conformity to the state-led business system, and it has protected 
the economic security of men over that of women. It is not surprising, then, that 
Japan’s business-state system (the core of Japanese capitalism) has normalized
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the dismissal of improvements to civil life in Japan, including the achievement of 
gender equality and family-work balance for its citizens.
In Japanese companies, gender bias is deeply embedded in the organizational 
customs associated with the system of lifelong employment—such as hiring, 
seniority pay and promotion, long working hours, and stereotyping—and cor­
rection of gender imbalance in these customs would require significant changes 
to employment and labor market practices in Japan. The case of Japanese com­
panies shows that spontaneous desegregation of the employment systems in 
advanced countries, even when women are highly educated and some legal 
protections are included, is unlikely to occur. Even with the introduction of 
government-led interventions and the emulation of Western policies aimed at 
achieving gender equality, certain Japanese management customs are likely to 
continue to block egalitarian reforms in Japan. In my view changes to gender 
inequality must occur not just through understanding the institutionalized gen­
der biases in traditional Japanese companies but also through active efforts to 
desegregate through employment and labor market reforms.
Japan’s Protection-Based Management 
and Coordinated Capitalism
The Japanese business system is characterized by its intimate institutional ties 
with the state. Japan’s business-state ties have promoted the male-breadwinner 
regime. The ideology of the traditional division between the genders has perme­
ated the culture and has been normalized in the realms of work, family, labor 
markets, and politics.
Japan’s business system prioritizes the lifelong employment of male workers 
in order to sustain the family that is based on having a male breadwinner and to 
keep industrial relations stable and management insider oriented. Firms value 
individual workers’ development of “in-firm” skills over skills that are not firm 
related, and there is little mobility and competition in the labor market. The 
term “Japanese management” usually refers to a set of customs, including lifelong 
employment and seniority-based pay and promotion policies, that guarantee an 
employee job security and family benefits. Workers do not change employers or 
companies but may change jobs inside a firm; this is what is referred to as the 
“internal labor market.” An employee’s long-term economic security is enabled by 
his company’s intimate ties with and dependence on a large bank. The employer’s 
reliance on bank financing enables the company to focus on long-term profits 
rather than short-term profits and competition. Under the lifelong-employment 
system, employers do not or cannot lay off workers even to save money, yet they
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may resort to offering early retirement to workers or terminating new hires, as 
well as hiring temporary staff. Lifelong employment is associated with the tradi­
tional male-breadwinner type of family, with the assumption of the man’s life­
long devotion to the company and the woman’s full responsibility for the family. 
Tax and pension policies in Japan have also explicitly favored male-breadwinner 
households. In contrast, US corporate governance and business management are 
based on competition and short-term profits, and their cost-saving strategies 
mostly rely on laying off employees. In addition, the custom of changing jobs and 
employers makes the US labor market diverse and competitive.
Scholars of the varieties of capitalism confirm that Japan’s version differs dra­
matically from that of the United States. Japanese corporate governance practices 
are known as “coordinated market economies,”25 or “coordinated capitalism,”26 
while those nations following the Anglo-Saxon model, such as the United States, 
are called “liberal market economies.” Peter Hall and David Soskice divide devel­
oped countries into two groups depending on the countries’ industrial relations, 
type of corporate governance, interfirm relations, employment relations, and 
the role of training and education in the labor market. They place Japan among 
the coordinated market economies along with countries such as Germany, Swit­
zerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.27 Like these 
other coordinated market economies, Japan has a highly protective employment 
structure, a closed labor market, and close ties between business and the state. 
Japanese capitalism differs from that found in the United States and other liberal 
market countries in the high levels of complementarities in its business systems, 
especially firms’ close ties with large banks that, through financial support, sta­
bilize the firms’ management and relations with other firms. This also enables 
lifelong employment for the employees of a firm, who, in return, are expected 
to show their gratitude in the form of devotion and loyalty to the company. 
Although in the United States and other liberal market economies sharehold­
ers pressure corporations to generate short-term profits, stakeholders such as 
financial institutions in Japan presumably focus on long-term goals, and this 
stakeholder protection enables firms to avoid market competition and pressures. 
In short, the close relationship in Japan among the state, the business sector, 
and the welfare system are different from such relationships in the United States. 
In the postwar decades, by providing economic security to employees and their 
families, Japanese firms have served as the central welfare agent and reduced the 
state’s burden of welfare costs.
Workers in large Japanese companies rarely change employers because of 
the lifelong-employment system, so there is little mobility in the labor market. The 
lifelong-employment system serves to strengthen long-term group conscious­
ness, as it rewards trustful relations among workers, insider-oriented decision
8 TOO FEW WOMEN AT THE TOP
making, and age-based promotions.28 Bringing outsiders into a company would 
be considered a disruption to the hierarchy of the firm.29 Lifelong employment 
saves the government from having to pay for unemployment insurance for laid- 
off workers; the government, in turn, offers the firms some advantages, including 
reduced competition.30 But this system, while ensuring the economic security of 
male workers and their families, has been costly to firms because they cannot 
fire workers and must therefore seek other forms of corporate cost savings, such 
as paying low salaries to young workers and women, requesting that employees 
take early retirement, relocating workers, and mandating long work hours. Some 
argue that the lifelong-employment system should be abolished or limited to a 
smaller number of workers because of its inefficiency.
Lifelong employment is a complementary protective system (based on close 
corporate-government ties) that can enable firms to avoid economic risks and 
uncertainties in the market and maintain stable corporate and industrial rela­
tions.31 However, the system’s emphasis on insider networks, workers’ minimal 
mobility in the labor market, and the lack of individual competition for promo­
tions and pay increases, which are solely based on workers’ ages, lower worker 
motivation and reduce business and organizational innovation while keeping 
authority and control on the side of management.32 Japan’s coordinated system 
has been criticized as having hampered economic growth as well as business 
innovation and individual creativity.33 Despite these claims, however, the rela­
tionships that business has with the government and banks—and those between 
business and labor—have changed little. Regardless of criticism of their meth­
ods, Japan’s system of business management and the Japanese labor market have 
undertaken few changes, simply because substantial transformations would be 
costly and would potentially destabilize the close relations among businesses, 
the state, industry, and employees. Steven Vogel explains that the major actors in 
Japanese capitalism, including the firms, banks, and unions, rely on such institu­
tions and traditions as lifetime employment, main bank relations, and interfirm 
networks to reduce their transaction costs, and firms will not abandon their cus­
tomary relations with the other actors under a system of coordinated capitalism 
unless they can count on obtaining greater efficiencies that outweigh the costs 
of sacrificing the current benefits.34 It can be difficult to change only one part of 
the system without disturbing the equilibrium of the entire system. Masahiko 
Aoki writes:
The presence of institutional complementarities certainly means that 
it is difficult to change only one piece of a coherent arrangement. But 
if shifts . . . become significant enough to cause substantial strategic 
adaptations by the agents in some domain, then overall institutional
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arrangements may become subject to a test because of complementary 
relationships across the domains. . . . Institutional complementarities 
thus never imply that existing institutional arrangements are frozen nor 
remain inertial. It implies that the process of change is initially con­
ditioned by existing complementary relationships and cannot be arbi­
trarily designed and enforced by law.35
Even though Aoki indicates that the system of Japanese business customs as 
a critical part of the Japanese business-state complementary system is not 
likely to change rapidly, he also adds that some companies are modifying 
traditional management customs and that institutional equilibrium among 
corporations, labor, and the state has also been slowly shifting and rebalanc­
ing. Yet it is likely that desegregation, or reducing the gender imbalance that 
exists under Japanese management, will be difficult precisely because sex seg­
regation has been functional as a cost saver to business and the government 
in Japan.
The question asked by many business scholars who research Japanese com­
panies is whether Japanese coordinated capitalism is ever likely to evolve into 
US-type liberal market capitalism. Vogel writes that “Japan has not adopted 
the US liberal market model because the Japanese did not want to adopt it,” 
and the overall benefits of Japan’s current reforms have been unclear.36 Mean­
while, Japanese companies remain reluctant to lay off workers, but those 
companies with high foreign ownership are likely to try downsizing.37 George 
Olcott’s study of several Japanese firms’ organizational changes shows the 
persistence of traditional Japanese management in Japanese companies, even 
under the strong influence of foreign shareholders.38 Although foreign own­
ership of Japanese companies is increasing, foreign firms in Japan may find it 
difficult to fully put into practice their home country’s management model 
since managers and shareholders must adapt themselves to the local con­
text.39 Scholars who produced earlier studies have shared the view that even 
though some Japanese firms may increasingly incorporate hybrid elements of 
Western management Japan is unlikely ever to approximate the type of liberal 
market-based corporate management and employment system seen in the 
United States.40 Some critics point out that Japan’s brand of capitalism has 
veered off the evolutionary path and is not adaptive to global changes.41 Yet 
most current researchers agree that Japan’s institutional complementarities 
and the equilibrium among Japanese employees, corporate management, the 
state, the labor market, and the family will continue to be sustained by several 
factors. These include vested interests (including existing lifelong-employed 
corporate and government workers);42 an entrenched business culture that
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values trust, loyalty, and consensual decision making;43 an aversion to the 
US-type market-driven economy and concern about social inequality;44 and 
the traditional value placed on conformity over individual freedom and cre­
ativity.45 What these business scholars have not adequately addressed is that 
such a model of protection-based corporate governance and codependent 
capitalism also makes women’s low status in Japanese companies very slow 
to change.
The Latent Function of Gender Inequality 
in Japanese Business
Takeshi Inagami and D. Hugh Whittaker describe Japanese firms as “commu­
nity firms,” with a culture based on employees’ strong “we-consciousness” and 
an exchange of loyalty for security, and point out that gender discrimination and 
male dominance are central to this culture, with women in Japanese firms mostly 
treated as “quasi-members . . .  or non members.”46 In a comparison of Japan’s 
business-state system with those of Sweden and the United States, Sven Steinmo 
argues that the pervasiveness of gender discrimination in Japanese business will 
eventually harm the Japanese economy by making the labor market still more 
rigid, causing reductions to Japan’s labor force and further lessening women’s 
incentive for reproduction.47 But there remains the question of how exactly the 
exclusion of and discrimination against women in Japanese companies oper­
ates in Japanese management customs. Why is vertical sex segregation inevitable 
under these customs? What is the logic of gender in each custom that is particularly 
disadvantageous to women?
Seniority pay and promotions coupled with provision of household benefits— 
the system that exists under the current Japanese management structure— 
generates a gender gap that in turn acts against women workers’ long-term 
upward mobility in their careers. Under the current system, workers must stay 
with a company for many years to receive promotion to management, which 
usually does not occur until the employee is in his or her late thirties. This sys­
tem of waiting until the late thirties or later for promotion makes it difficult 
for many women workers to incorporate reproduction and family life into their 
plans. Thus, young women are incentivized to choose the caretaker path over that 
of career advancement. The lack of mobility in the labor market also restricts 
women’s ability to go up the career ladder.
Some companies continue to use career-track hiring, in which women are 
explicitly relegated to assistant-level jobs with low pay and little chance of pro­
motion. Even when companies do not use career-track hiring, they still hire
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far more men than women and simultaneously hire a large number of edu­
cated women as temporary workers for assistant positions. As long as Japanese 
companies retain lifelong-employment spots exclusively for men and simul­
taneously protect middle management and senior men with age-based salary 
increases, they have an incentive to cut costs by continuing these gender-biased 
hiring practices.
By committing to lifelong employment, Japanese companies have pro­
vided a social safety net to families in lieu of having it provided by the 
Japanese state.48 Because companies do not fire workers, they have to search 
elsewhere for cost reductions, and their options are limited. Under the life­
long-employment system, firms can use traditional workforce reduction 
strategies such as shukko (secondment, or temporary transfer to a related 
firm) and tenseki (permanent transfer to a related firm),49 or they can force 
early retirement on some senior workers. But Japanese companies lay off far 
fewer workers than US companies such as IBM or AT&T.50 Japanese firms 
introduced some liberalization reforms in the 1990s and started hiring 
young male and female temporary workers in order to save labor costs. But 
the firms’ reforms resulted in a dichotomization of the labor force between 
young workers (often women) with no economic security and senior work­
ers with economic security and generous benefits.51 This division of workers 
continued to be a popular cost-saving method for many Japanese firms in 
the 2000s.32 This partial liberalization is not adequate, however, to cover the 
cost of having lifelong workers, especially when a company’s revenues are 
falling. Mari Miura points out that Japanese companies’ strong employment 
protection has been maintained through this use of a large number of cheap 
part-time and temporary female workers.53
Furthermore, the custom of long working hours, which is another central 
cost-saving method of Japanese management, reifies the male work norm and 
bolsters sex segregation by rewarding only those women who emulate this style. 
The culture of long working hours can incorporate women only as long as they 
successfully follow the pattern of prioritizing their work over their personal and 
family lives. Thus, the overwork norm reinforces the dilemma facing women 
workers, who often conclude they have only two options in their careers: they 
either emulate the male work norm or opt out.
Finally, it will be many years before the number of women managers in Japa­
nese companies reaches parity with that of men, as there is so little mobility in 
the labor market under lifelong employment and opportunity is mostly based on 
seniority. Women workers’ absence in high-level management in Japanese com­
panies reinforces traditional gender stereotypes and makes it difficult to reduce 
gender essentialism and misogyny in the workplace.
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Gendered Management Customs in Japan
Past studies have revealed that womens low status is embedded in the organiza­
tional customs of Japanese companies. A few scholars have pointed out the link 
between Japan’s employment system and gender-discriminatory practices. For 
example, Brinton and others have pointed out that lifelong employment and 
seniority pay are disadvantageous to women workers who might wish to start 
families;54 they preferentially reward men who work for long years without inter­
ruption.55 The same customs reinforce gender stereotypes that depict women 
as being incapable of lifelong devotion and sacrifice for their companies,56 even 
though these same companies offer them only assistant-level jobs because of the 
likelihood that they will quit when they marry and have children.
A few ethnographic studies of Japanese companies have revealed the nexus 
between the employment system and marginalization of women workers. For 
example, Yuko Ogasawara’s ethnographic study of a large bank in the 1980s and 
Karen Shire’s interviews with employees of financial and automobile manufac­
turing firms in the 1990s demonstrated that the hiring track for women relegates 
them to marginal positions with lower pay and few promotion chances and that 
women have traditionally been expected to quit their jobs when they marry.57 
Shire found that women workers “were evaluated on their grooming and tem­
perament, while men were evaluated on decision making and analytical style, and 
how they expressed opinions.”58 Ogasawara’s work illustrated Japanese women’s 
unique combination of resistance to and conformity with male authority. The 
women workers in her study served their Japanese companies as “cheap and 
docile labor” while simultaneously resisting the corporate hierarchy by explicitly 
taking authority lightly and “hid[ing] critical, observant eyes underneath their 
demure attitudes and feminine smiles.”59
Kimiko Kimoto’s study of general merchandise supermarkets and department 
stores disclosed how the Japanese management system negatively affects women’s 
ambition.60 She observed that many women workers are given “boredom- 
inducing jobs” or assistant-level work and express low ambition to climb the 
managerial ladder, especially if it requires extremely long work-hour com­
mitment. Alice Lam’s book about a large department store demonstrates that 
the gender division, wherein the women sell and the men manage, is embed­
ded in both male and female mentalities and normalized in organizational cul­
ture.61 Lam points out that the uniqueness of Japanese management lies in its 
normalization, justification, and maintenance of sex discrimination in ordinary 
customs.62 Heidi Gottfried’s study of temporary-help agencies found that the 
companies’ hiring of women temporary workers included screening based on 
gendered traits such as age, appearance, tone of voice, and posture, especially
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because “women's ornamental appearance becomes an important qualifica­
tion for attracting the male gaze .”63 In her article, she reported that women were 
mostly relegated to being men’s assistants and judged according to traditional 
male views of attractiveness. She found that the relationship between regular full­
time male workers and temporary female workers represented a typical gender 
regime. She concluded that “organizations select workers on the basis of an aes­
thetic code that predisposes the preference for female embodiment of temporary 
work and privilege attributes linked to masculinity and the heterosexual family 
man.”64 Japanese managers apparently have long subscribed to gender essential- 
ism, heteronormative behaviors, and have normalized sex segregation in given 
tasks, responsibilities, and opportunities. These organizationally embedded and 
normalized gender biases and discriminatory customs have been legitimized by 
the male-protection-based employment system in Japan’s coordinated capitalist 
society.
Strong employment protection in a business may even exacerbate employers’ 
gender biases and workplace vertical segregation. Margarita Estevez-Abe argues 
that the degree of sex segregation in capitalist countries is shaped by their dif­
ferent corporate skill regimes: countries with coordinated market economies, 
which institutionally support firm-specific skills and emphasize workers’ long­
term economic security, have higher levels of organizational vertical segregation 
than countries with liberal market economies, where credential-based skills, such 
as those obtained through education, are more highly valued.65 She argues that 
in countries with coordinated market economies employers’ long-term commit­
ment to their workers along with strong job protections and the high costs asso­
ciated with hiring and firing workers institutionally legitimizes a negative bias 
against female workers, given that women are likely to interrupt their careers for 
childbearing, while liberal market countries carry fewer biases because they rely 
heavily on gender-neutral characteristics in hiring, such as educational diplomas 
and vocational certifications. According to Estevez-Abe, a reduction in vertical 
segregation in coordinated market countries may require a reduction in workers’ 
overall employment protections.66
I shall revisit the above arguments and examine the direct and causal links 
between the business and management practices of Japanese companies and 
the consequences of vertical sex segregation. In the 1980s, and even in the early 
1990s, there were very few women managers or working mothers in Japanese 
companies. Only 15 percent of women attended four-year colleges, and 20 per­
cent of women attended two-year colleges in the late 1980s. But the gender gap in 
education has been rapidly narrowing. Furthermore, because of decreasing pres­
sure to marry at a young age, there are increasingly high numbers of educated 
employed women in various positions and at a variety of levels in large Japanese
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firms. Also, because of the government’s promotion of married women’s con­
tinuing presence in the workplace and lenient parental leave, working moth­
ers are increasingly visible in the workplace. However, corporate customs and 
culture continue to shape a high level of vertical sex segregation and constrain 
women’s upward mobility.
Until the early 1990s, the age norm played an important role in women’s deci­
sion to marry, with both families and employers pressuring women to marry by 
their late twenties, and many women quitting their jobs when they married.67 
But marital age has become highly variable in Japan because of the “younger 
generation’s departure from adherence to the strong age-at-marriage norm of 
their parents’ generation.”68 The decline of the marital age norm and the marital 
norm itself, combined with the rapid rise in women’s education and employment 
and a deregulated labor market that is increasing the number and types of posi­
tions women workers are hired into, have changed the way that many women are 
conducting their working lives. Thus, it is critical to question Japan’s structural 
and institutional sex segregation, especially its slowness to change as it relates 
to organizational and management customs. I believe that what it will take to 
implement desegregation is more than just increasing the number of women 
employers and women managers, who may simply be seen as ornaments by other 
workers. Japanese companies need women with power and authority, but this 
will require some serious structural and organizational changes accompanied by 
changes in beliefs and practices common to Japanese corporate governance and 
capitalism. Incorporating women workers into the current Japanese manage­
ment system as equals with men will also be costly unless Japan transforms the 
lifelong-employment system and related customs. Taking gender equality seri­
ously in Japanese firms will require increased awareness of the responsibility of 
traditional Japanese management for the low status of women in Japan.
Democratic Values in Japan
It has been assumed by many that gender equality would progress along with 
Japan’s modernization. However, because gender inequality has been a critical 
part of institutional equilibrium in Japan, addressing it requires great changes to 
the Japanese system. In addition, Japan’s slow pace in the reduction of sex segre­
gation and gender inequality may be partly due to Japanese capitalism’s strong 
adherence to nondemocratic “survival” values, driven by the business commu­
nity and the state, rather than by more rational and individualistic values.
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel argue that gender egalitarianism is a 
critical component of democracy and human advancement and an emancipatory
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force in modern nations that shapes the development of the autonomous self.69 
If the rise of gender egalitarianism is connected to the rise of values relating 
to democracy and individual autonomy, can we explain Japan’s slow progress 
in terms of the absence of these values? According to Inglehart, Pippa Norris, 
and Welzel, a country’s economic development leads to an increase in demo­
cratic values and thus to greater gender equality.70 Measuring societies’ values 
on two dimensions—traditional values vs. secular-rational values and survival 
values vs. self-expression values—they explain that societies with the strongest 
traditional values strongly emphasize the importance of parent-child ties, defer­
ence to authority, family values, and nationalism, while societies leaning toward 
secular-rational values have preferences centered on individual difference, inde­
pendence, and freedom. Societies that are all about survival also place the highest 
value on materialism and hard work while having little tolerance for difference 
and diversity. Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel argue that as economic development 
progresses there should be a shift from survival values toward self-expression val­
ues and that this should also lead the society to adopt gender equality, since daily 
work in modern knowledge-based societies requires individual judgment and 
innovation rather than following routines dictated from above, and thus an indi­
vidual’s self-expression becomes indispensable.71 Democratization is a complex 
process that a society’s religious heritage, work structure, and level of economic 
development all influence.72 Japan is economically developed, but traditional Japa­
nese values emphasize family and group conformity and a catch-up-with-the-West 
type of survival imperative, which enforces homogeneity, a hierarchy-dominated 
corporate culture, and a business-state coordinated system.
According to this theory of democracy and gender equality, the rise of such 
an economy leads to increasing emphasis on self-expressive values and then to 
the development of democracy (not the other way around). The rise of mate­
rial, intellectual, and social autonomy leads to people’s aversion to hierarchy 
and authority and their preference for freedom and equality.73 The rise of liberal 
democracy is a key to the progress of gender equality in a country, and the rise 
of liberal democracy occurs when there are shifts in traditional values and the 
development of a public consciousness opposed to traditional authority, collec­
tivism, and conformity. The continuing dominance in Japan of rigid hierarchical 
systems and conformity in business management suggests that Japan is much 
closer to authoritarian countries than to Western democratic countries. If Japan’s 
capitalism revolves around traditional nondemocratic values, it is not surprising 
that gender inequality, which is also a critical element of Japanese capitalism, has 
not been reduced substantially.
Japan’s system of capitalism is understood as being entirely different from the 
liberal, individualistic capitalism of the United States. Some argue that Japan’s
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social values—especially the values of conformity and the hierarchy based on 
age, gender, and education—inhibit the evolution of Japanese society, individual 
creativity, and innovation.74 Conversely, some scholars argue that the values of 
conformity and hierarchy in Japan are simply characteristic of a different demo­
cratic style and that Japan is a solidly democratic country that just happens to be 
different from Western democracies.75
Gosta Esping-Andersen famously described three state regime types: (1) the 
social democratic model, exemplified by the Scandinavian countries with their 
strong emphasis on the role of the state in guaranteeing gender equality, social 
rights, and household welfare; (2) the conservative welfare model, in which fami­
lies rely on the male breadwinner and men's long-term employment; and (3) the 
liberal state, with its strong emphasis on individualism and the market.76 Japan 
belongs to the second type, in which women’s job status is low and their equality 
is also suppressed by traditional family values and roles. Andersen argues that 
Japan’s welfare system is shaped by the dominance of these old-fashioned values, 
which reflect the country’s Confucianism-oriented, age-based hierarchical sys­
tem. In Andersen’s model, Confucianism in Japan is like Catholicism in Europe, 
which has blocked gender equality and women’s independence in countries such 
as Italy and Spain.77 Mary Alice Haddad likewise points out that Confucianism 
values group orientation and the social order.78 Regardless of such different bases 
of democracy, Haddad explains, Japan’s younger generation has been becoming 
more democratic than previous generations, and political institutions have also 
become more democratic than before.
Others disagree with the claim that Japan’s emphasis on group values and 
hierarchy derive from Confucianism, especially considering that Asian countries 
are characterized by diverse cultural values and beliefs (even though all are influ­
enced by Confucianism).79 Thomas Rohlen is one of these; he posits that parent­
ing and socialization are the major factors contributing to Japanese acceptance 
of order and hierarchical authority.80 Others argue that group conformity might 
stem largely from Japan’s modernization and industrialization after World War II.81 
Group conformity was indeed the driving force behind the development of Japa­
nese companies and thus the country’s economic growth after the war.
Decision making is also based on group conformity in Japanese organizations, 
but it has been criticized as the source of organizational inertia in these firms. 
Group conformity usually is institutionalized along the lines of a gendered and 
age-based hierarchy. Because such value systems are reinforced by salaries, which 
are also based on age and gender, the pay system may need to be uncoupled from 
cultural values before democratization of the decision-making process can occur.
Japan’s civil society has been state led to a great degree in its modernization 
process; the state is considered a worthy object of subordination or sacrifice.82
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Andrew Barshay cites the regulation scholar Toshio Yamada’s words—“One can­
not understand postwar Japan without looking at corporations”—and reframes 
Japan’s civil society in terms of Kiyoaki Hirata’s concept of Japan as “the enter­
prise state” in which worker relations with both the firm and the state are based 
on intense conformity and exploitation, characterized by a lack of autonomy 
or fairness.83 Referring to Tetsuro Kato and Hirata, Barshay argues that the fre­
quency of workers’ deaths by overwork, or karoshi, demonstrates their subordi­
nation to their firms, and that this brutal exploitation of workers has been an 
entrenched part of state-led corporate development.84 Turning to the Japanese 
thinker Yoshihiko Uchida, Barshay further writes:
In modern times, Japan had gone from “semi-feudal” to “supermodern” 
through the agency of war, reconstruction, and growth, but without the full 
realization of civil society. Would Uchida have found in the decadence of the 
postwar system a chance for a fundamental redefinition of Japan’s civil soci­
ety? Or would he have thought that in the name of globalization, civil society 
was again being sacrificed to the gods of capital? On the one hand, while 
severe competition eroded profits, technological innovation also created new 
possibilities for their realization by reducing “socially necessary labor time.” 
In this situation, some workers could find themselves with less (or shared) 
work but increased “time sovereignty” and the chance for enhanced par­
ticipation in civic life as the collective narcissism of the enterprise gave way 
to a more mature and diversified perspective. Alternatively, in a society that 
has tended to equate the status of “human being” (ningen) with enterprise 
membership, greater unemployment would surely bring pervasive anomie 
or worse, while those who retain their identity as corporate employees might 
find themselves subject to still greater demands for unrewarded labor.85
Japan’s economic development and modernization did not entail democratic 
practices and beliefs in the Western sense; instead, Japan, in building its democ­
racy, mandated the subordination of labor to the state and the company. Here, the 
“survival” of the nation-state was seen as the mission of companies and individual 
workers alike. This “survival” value also legitimizes the existence of a gender hierar­
chy and the division of labor. In this context, Japan’s survival as a first-rate modern 
country was seen to require group-led conformity under Japan’s system of coor­
dinated capitalism, and the values of equality, diversity, and individualism would 
have to wait. Japan’s deficiency in individual autonomy—and its lack of importance 
to Japan’s democracy—has been pointed out by the political scientist Maruyama 
Masao, who posits that it was a major cause of wartime fascism in the country.86
The dominant concepts of conformity and hierarchy in Japanese manage­
ment do not incorporate the value of equality. It would require great effort to
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replace the virtue of self-sacrifice with the Western notion of “work-life balance” 
in Japanese companies. The “survival” value of Japanese capitalism has not been 
reduced or replaced by the “self-expressive,” and management and labor markets 
continue to operate accordingly. Sex segregation in Japanese companies should 
be examined in the context of Japan's adherence to survival- and conformity- 
based management. Women workers' aspirations, as well as their opportunities 
for upward mobility and economic independence, have been suppressed by the 
dominant state-driven economic-development regime and tailored to fit gen­
dered separate-sphere values. If gender egalitarianism is a critical component 
of democracy and human advancement,87 desegregation in Japanese firms will thus 
require value shifts in existing management. The Japanese government might 
expect a state-led gender policy copied from the West to bring about gender 
egalitarianism in Japan, but it is not a matter of one policy; rather, change must 
reverberate through the entire system of Japanese capitalism. Steinmo points out 
the problem with Japan s traditional “survival” or “catch up with the West” atti­
tudes: “Japan is unlikely to successfully adapt if it continues to simply import 
policies from abroad. Its leaders should instead consider both how to adapt new 
ideas to the system's strengths and weaknesses, as well as consider what kind 
of country they would like to build.”88 Under enterprise-led economic devel­
opment, gender egalitarianism, individualism, and a flexible labor market have 
not been fully developed. The labor market and employment structure in Japan, 
based on age, gender, and education, must become responsive to and reward 
individual aspirations.
In the United States, gender egalitarianism has progressed partly as a result of 
liberal individualism. Paula England explains educated middle-class American 
women's aspiring to do traditionally male jobs and a narrowing gender gap in 
these jobs in terms of America's valuation of liberal individualism and a belief 
in self-expressiveness and equal opportunity.89 American women strive to seek 
their “true selves” and attain greater upward mobility than was possible for their 
mothers. For individual belief in self-fulfillment to translate into high-ranking 
jobs, though, the labor market must guarantee certain levels of equal opportu­
nity. In Japan such envisioning of a “true self” may not be so difficult on an indi­
vidual level, but navigating personal desire and realizing that true self in the rigid 
labor market and sex-segregated Japanese companies is very difficult. As long as 
the labor market and employment structure lack the flexibility to adjust to such 
developments, gender inequality in Japan is unlikely to change.
Finally, when we compare past changes in women’s status in the United States 
with those in Japan, the role of effective laws and courts with the authority to rep­
rimand companies for discrimination cannot be ignored. Japanese gender laws 
are known to be ineffective, with the state lacking the ability to impose sanctions
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and penalties on companies that flout the rules. The laws also are biased toward 
Japanese companies, and the Japanese courts follow a set of highly bureaucratic 
and conformity-driven norms, making them unwilling to set legal precedents 
and positioning them as highly conservative as concerns gender equality.90 Japan 
has not therefore seen the passage of laws helpful to the emergence of gender 
egalitarianism, whereas in the United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and 
various decisions of the Supreme Court—applied within firms by corporate and 
legal professionals such as attorneys, personnel professionals, human resources 
specialists, and consultants—have made huge contributions to developing gender- 
parity measures and grievance procedures.91 Also, the discourses of capitalism 
and democracy, in which the values of fairness and efficiency overlap, have 
pushed the US business and legal climates toward greater gender equality. If a 
legal system that can push for and materialize democratic values is necessary for 
desegregation and egalitarianism, Japan may have to take a different approach.
Organizational Analysis
I base this book about sex segregation in Japanese firms on feminist studies writ­
ten from the gendered-organizational perspective, which allows more context- 
specific analysis of gendered customs and practices than other organizational 
approaches. By using the gendered-organizational perspective, I situate sex seg­
regation and unequal power dynamics in certain customs within the concrete 
contexts of Japanese firms. Organizational analysis allows us to discover how sex 
segregation has been reinforced informally through hierarchies, hiring practices, 
gender biases, and worker relations.
Traditionally, sex segregation has been explained from two differing view­
points: a demand-side perspective that emphasizes such things as employers’ 
statistical discrimination against women workers and a supply-side perspective 
that sees the gender gap as mostly resulting from women’s choices (being less 
committed to or invested in their jobs as compared to men due to their domestic 
responsibilities or different socialization paths and preferences).92 In the labor 
economy, the human-capital theory emphasizes women’s lack of investment in 
education or their choice of occupations that require fewer skills and less engage­
ment as a result of their spending more time outside of work.93 Furthermore, 
even with increasing corporate and governmental intervention and the entrance of 
more educated women into the labor market, sex segregation persists because 
of unchanging workplace practices. The organizational culture retains gender 
biases and stereotypes that are embedded in workplace customs. Traditional
explanations of sex segregation, however, do little to help us understand the 
mechanisms and processes by which sex segregation is reinforced at the organi­
zational level.94
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Gendered Organizations
Feminist scholars have argued that the logic of organizations entails gender and 
that gender equality is unattainable without organizational changes in gendered 
customs and practices.95 Studies of gendered organizations shed light on the 
context-specific analysis of organizations—including the operation of gendered 
beliefs, ideologies, and dominant patterns of behavior that are unique to certain 
workplaces and occupations—and their impacts on workers’ relationships and 
identities, aspirations, and career paths. These studies examine the “mechanisms 
that produce inequality at work” as “inequalities of gender, race, class and sexual­
ity [that] are deeply entrenched in workplace cultures, interactions, and even the 
identities of workers.”96
Studies of gendered organizations often examine the ideologies of gender 
at multiple levels of the organizational structure. Joan Acker suggests that we 
examine the operation of gender-divisive ideologies in five aspects of organi­
zations: (1) the division of labor, (2) the construction of symbols, (3) inter­
actions among workers, (4) individual identity, and (5) organizational logic 
and assumptions that often shape the hierarchy of the organization.97 An orga­
nization often legitimizes the ideology of separate spheres by recreating “the 
gendered divide between paid work and unpaid family reproductive work, 
consigning the latter, and women, to a subordinated and devalued position 
as practice and belief put the demands of the work organization first over the 
demands of the rest of life.”98 By normalizing separate-sphere beliefs, the orga­
nization also legitimizes its “nonresponsibility” for “human survival and repro­
duction,” thus marginalizing reproductive and caring activities that are tied 
mostly to women’s work.99
Studies of gendered organizations often employ the concept of “masculinity” 
to illuminate workers’ dominant gendered behaviors that have been constructed 
in the workplace. A variety of masculine customs and practices in the work­
place—such as aggressiveness, competitiveness, autocracy, and market- or profit- 
driven behavior—have been postulated as common factors that deprive women 
of power,100 but, importantly, men’s and women’s beliefs about and practice of 
masculinities in the workplace differ depending on the structural position of 
women and their degree of power and authority.101 It is well known that most 
Japanese companies have been shaped by the separate-sphere ideology and tra­
ditional masculinity and femininity. Also, examining Japanese firms’ practices
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and beliefs illuminates how the organizational structures, customs, and hierar­
chies that have reinforced sex segregation remain central to Japan’s institutional 
regimes.
Dana Britton offers an important critique of studies of gendered organi­
zations, arguing that “the meaning of labeling an organization, an occupa­
tion, a policy, or a practice as gendered is still theoretically and empirically 
unclear.”102 Britton and Laura Logan, however, write that even though stud­
ies of gendered organizations offer few theoretical generalities, their context- 
specific approach adds “complexities” to the field, and they maintain that such 
complexities “increase our knowledge of the processes whereby organizations 
become gendered.”103 Gendered-organizational perspectives are useful for 
assessing various types of work and professional mechanisms of gender. For 
example, Christine Williams, Chandra Muller, and Kristine Kilanski write that 
basic organizational logic has been transformed over the past few decades 
because, under the so-called new economy, “work is increasingly character­
ized by job insecurity, teamwork, career maps, and networking,” yet the pro­
cesses by which the work is organized continue to have gendered impacts and 
consequences.104
I employ the gendered-organizations approach in this book because it offers 
the opportunity for an in-depth and contextualized analysis of the organizational 
practices and beliefs that have reinforced vertical sex segregation in five Japanese 
companies. Looking at multiple aspects of organizational customs and struc­
tures is effective when internal and external corporate changes occur—such as 
the rapid rise of educated women in the workforce and the implementation of 
corporate policies regarding gender equality—yet organizational inertia remains 
unchanged.
In US research, the gendered-organizational approach also takes into account 
context-specific diversity and equality programs. Even in the United States, which 
is far more desegregated than Japan, further progress in uprooting sex segrega­
tion has been slow, and many organizations have failed to change or even question 
gendered customs and beliefs.105 Robin Ely, Herminia Ibarra, and Deborah Kolb 
point out that existing organizational remedial programs tend to locate the prob­
lem only in women.106 Ely and Debra Meyerson argue that organizations have 
employed three types of interventions: (1) the “fix women” approach, (2) the 
“value femininity” approach, and (3) the “create equal opportunity” approach. 
In the “fix women” approach, a firm tries to eliminate gender inequality by 
changing women and training women to perform on a par with men.107 This 
approach, which mostly encourages women to assimilate to the existing orga­
nizational norm, blames women as the source of the problem and leaves 
the organization’s male standard unchallenged. Whereas the second approach,
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“value femininity,” encourages workers to value traditional femininity and gen­
der differences, this does little more than reinforce womens appropriateness and 
the gendered power imbalance. The third approach, “create equal opportunity,” 
aims to remove structural gender barriers primarily through formal policy-based 
changes such as affirmative action programs, formal mentoring, and work-family 
programs. Although policy-based interventions have greatly contributed to the 
decline of some barriers, Ely and Meyerson argue that they are not sufficient 
because they do not challenge the beliefs and norms that legitimize the gender 
imbalance. They suggest the necessity of putting in place more context-specific 
interventions against unequal informal practices in addition to formal policies 
concerning work rules, labor rules, labor contracts, managerial directives, job 
descriptions, performance-appraisal systems, and distribution of work respon­
sibilities, including the information people receive regarding advancement in 
the organization and tacit criteria for competence or fitting in.108 Corporate 
culture plays an essential role in the likelihood of firms’ implementing effective 
organizational strategies and diversity programs.109 Thus, it is not enough to 
have some type of formal gender policy in place; in addition, workers’ views 
of organizational culture and workplace accommodation of formal changes in 
gender policy need to be examined.
Gender Bias
Knowledge of gender biases and stereotypes is important in understanding sex 
segregation. Gender biases, often institutionalized, stem from differing motives 
on the part of employers and managers. They often derive from organizational 
inertia or an employer’s reluctance to implement changes in old customs. Barbara 
Reskin and Debra McBrier argue that organizational inertia maintains employ­
ers’ sex-based ascription or gender-essentialist biases because of employers’ aver­
sion to paying the extra selection costs associated with filling jobs with women 
or even creating new formal structures.110 To most hiring managers, who prefer 
to choose persons who resemble themselves, it can feel like a risk to place women 
over men. Organizational inertia is often “built around cognitive, interactional 
and institutional processes” that can reinforce the gendered division of labor in 
the form of recruitment, evaluation, hiring, and retention of employees.111 At the 
same time, any rapid or forceful attempts to change old customs may be met with 
complaints that exhibit gender bias and prejudice. In the Japanese companies 
I researched for this book, women with power have been historically few, and 
recent increases in the number of women managers in these companies have 
been met with mixed emotions by existing workers and viewed through the lens 
of traditional gender stereotypes.
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Gender bias also derives from a strong belief in male primacy. Research shows 
that “there is little direct evidence that men are more productive workers than 
women,” and it also indicates that it is not clear that men are less stable employ­
ees, even though women “as a group” might have more interrupted careers.112 
England argues that employers mistakenly underestimate group average pro­
ductivity and use gender stereotypes, and she refers to this as “error discrimina­
tion ”113 Donald Tomaskovic-Devey and Sheryl Skaggs argue that the productivity 
of individual workers is shaped and constrained by their existing roles, which are 
assigned according to the organizations division of labor and that the gender gap 
in productivity is thus more likely to derive from the unequal structure of the 
gender division than from individual traits.114 With little reason other than preju­
dice, employers commonly place higher trust in men than in women. Traditional 
male domination in upper-level positions intensifies the decision makers’ gen­
der biases.115 When uncertainty is involved in managerial work, employers and 
decision makers tend to show gender bias in their inferences about a candidate’s 
ability to perform at a high level.116 Previous research provides evidence to refute 
the common employer bias that women workers are less committed to their jobs 
than men. In their research in Britain and the United States, Elizabeth Gorman 
and Julie Kmec found that “women have to try harder than men at work, across 
a wide variety of jobs,” as “employers impose higher performance standards on 
women than on men, even when men and women hold the same jobs.”117 As a 
result, women may experience greater job stress, exhaustion, and burnout, and 
this indicates that, even as explicit discrimination becomes less common, the 
mechanisms of job experiences and rewards remain highly gendered.118
In Japanese companies, with their custom of lifelong employment, statistical 
discrimination has been commonly employed to justify hiring men and women 
for different positions. Using statistical discrimination, employers have avoided 
hiring and promoting women because of their perception that they are more 
likely to resign from their jobs or be more intermittent in terms of job produc­
tivity. Male supremacy has been a major assumption of Japanese management 
because of men’s higher likelihood of lifelong commitment.
Gender bias also promotes in-group preferences, which leads to the exclu­
sion of women from male bonds. It is known that male decision makers are 
more likely than female decision makers to prefer male candidates for hiring and 
promotion.119 Studies have found that powerful groups constantly seek to insti­
tutionalize their privileges,120 so employers tend to place men ahead of women 
in labor queues for the most desirable jobs.121 Homophily is often maintained 
as a result of workers’ and clients’, as well as employers’, in-group preferences. 
Networking is an outcome of in-group preferences and thus is an aspect of the 
gender-based reciprocal business system. In a study of one thousand financial
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network members, it was demonstrated that even when women break into male 
circles workers may rank network members along gendered lines.122
By the same token, it may work in womens favor when there are a high num­
ber of women with authority; they may be motivated to help other women or 
prefer to interact with others who are similar to them.123 Purcell, MacArthur, and 
Samblanet argue that past research has shown that “institutionalizing, and legiti­
mizing, female leadership increases equality (e.g., greater influence and pay for 
women), and placing men and women in the same positions may lessen inequal­
ity over time.”124 In highly male-dominated environments, such as Japanese com­
panies, the recruiting of women or women entering male-only circles may take 
considerable effort unless top management intentionally generates such paths 
for women workers or increases the number of women with authority who are 
powerful enough to change male-only customs in their companies.
The Importance of Women with Power
The impact of women with power and authority on desegregation is a critical 
question for organizational theorists. Studies suggest that the presence of more 
women in managerial positions relates to a reduction in segregation.125 For 
example, it is known that women’s representation in managerial jobs, especially 
in high-level leadership positions, reduces the wage gap between women and 
men.126 Regarding workplace programs, executives are more likely to adopt diver­
sity programs when they have higher proportions of white women in manage­
ment who push for these programs.127
According to Kevin Stainback and Soyoung Kwon, when women are pres­
ent in leadership positions, it helps female subordinates in the following three 
ways: (1) in-group preference in hiring, promotion, and wage-setting deci­
sions; (2) increased access to career-enhancing social networks and mentor­
ing opportunities; and (3) reduced gender stereotypes and increased women’s 
representation in higher level positions.128 In their empirical study of South 
Korean organizations, Stainback and Kwon found that organizations with a 
higher percentage of women in managerial jobs tend to have lower observed 
levels of sex segregation.129
Japanese companies exhibit an extreme form of vertical sex segregation, as 
they are severely lacking in women leaders. This is not just the case in the busi­
ness world; the overall society suffers from an absence of women with power and 
authority. The effect of this absence of women with power on subordinate work­
ers has not been well investigated. Past studies in the United States and Europe, 
however, have addressed the negative consequences of a lack of women leaders in 
organizations. One good example is Ely’s comparative study of male-dominated
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law firms and gender-integrated law firms in the United States.130 She found that 
the women in male-dominated law firms had far more negative views about their 
career prospects, other female workers, and their self-images than the women in 
gender-integrated law firms. Women workers’ views of their jobs, their careers, 
and themselves in male-dominated law firms are often shaped by men’s views of 
what they want from the women. According to Ely, women in male-dominated 
firms in which few women with power are present perceive that playing two 
roles is critical to their success: the masculine role and the seductress/sex object 
role—“roles defined by men’s preferences.”131 She notes that women workers 
in these firms express stronger gender stereotypes, a sense of less competence 
and satisfaction, and lower expectations for promotion than women in gender- 
integrated law firms. Women workers in Japanese firms may be in circumstances 
similar to those in the male-dominated firms in Ely’s study, perhaps subscrib­
ing to a high level of gender bias themselves and feeling pessimistic about their 
advancement and future job prospects. In organizations with few senior women 
or women with power, those few can turn into “queen bees” and becoming com- 
plicit with the privileged group of men, denying the firm’s sexism, turning a blind 
eye to women’s disadvantaged position, and maybe even mistreating younger 
women.132 Although some authors point out that such an image of senior women 
can be highly male biased or sexist, the appearance of queen bees is well known 
as an organizational symptom of male dominance. Because there have been few 
female managers in most Japanese companies, it is not surprising that tensions 
among women workers reflect misogyny or competition and hierarchy among 
women.
Beyond the lack of women leaders, the problems in Japanese companies 
extend to the way the government and companies have superficially increased the 
numbers of women rapidly over the last few years without addressing structural 
and organizational problems. This causes workers and managers to question 
whether those women are as qualified as the men holding the same positions. 
Such concerns and criticisms about Japan’s government-led desegregation may 
also increase criticism of new women managers in Japanese companies.
Overview of the Book
The following chapters investigate the logic of gender and organizational pro­
cesses in which sex segregation and gender inequality emerge in the customs 
of hiring, pay, and promotion; the practice of long working hours; workplace 
gender stereotypes; gendered consequences of overtime work; and sexual 
harassment.
